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Democracy and its Discontents:  
Understanding Kenya’s 2013 elections  
 
Nic Cheeseman, University of Oxford 
Gabrielle Lynch, University of Warwick 
Justin Willis, University of Durham 
 
 
In the months leading up to Kenya’s general election of March 2013, there was much 
concern – both within Kenya itself and internationally – that political competition would 
trigger a fresh wave of ethnic violence.1 However, the 2013 elections passed off largely 
peacefully, despite an unexpected presidential result and fact that the losing candidate, 
Raila Odinga, appealed the outcome at the Supreme Court. This article argues that Kenya 
avoided political unrest as a result of four interconnected processes. A dramatic political 
realignment brought former rivals together and gave them an incentive to diffuse ethnic 
tensions; a pervasive “peace narrative” delegitimised political activity likely to lead to 
political instability; partial democratic reforms conferred new legitimacy on the 
electoral and political system; and a new constitution meant that many voters who “lost” 
nationally in the presidential election “won” in local contests. This election provides two 
important lessons for the democratisation literature: processes of gradual reform may 
generate more democratic political systems in the long-run, but in the short-run they 
can empower the political establishment; while a lack of violence at the perceived cost 
of justice risks a “negative peace” that can be associated with an increased sense of 
marginalisation and exclusion in some quarters. The question for Kenya is how these 
contradictory trends will bear out in the future.  
 
Key words: Kenya; elections; democratisation; constitutional and institutional reform; 
peace and justice   
 
In the months leading up to the Kenyan elections of March 2013, there was much 
concern – both within Kenya itself and internationally – that political 
competition would trigger a fresh wave of ethnic violence. The disputed elections 
of 2007/8 led to widespread civil unrest that captured the attention of the 
world’s media. Kenyans were uncomfortably aware that every election since 
1992, with the partial exception of that in 2002, had seen considerable local 
violence. Popular apprehension was heightened by the fact that there was much 
at stake in the 2013 elections, which, as in 2007, boiled down to a two-horse race 
between a Kikuyu leader – Uhuru Kenyatta of the new Jubilee Alliance – and a 
Luo rival – Raila Odinga who headed the new Coalition for Reform and 
Democracy (CORD). The polls were also the first to be held under a new 
constitution designed to devolve power away from the president. The elections 
thus seemed to hold dramatically contrary possibilities: they might see Kenya 
plunged back into violence, setting one ethnic group against another; or they 
might confirm the success of a process of institutional transformation. 
Ultimately, the elections passed off largely peacefully, but they did not confirm a 
process of institutional transformation or herald the end of inter-ethnic tension 
and mistrust.  
 
Despite the complexity of the political process established by the new 
constitution – with six simultaneous elections for different levels of 
representation – the ballot was conducted on time and voting was completed 
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within a single day. Official voter turnout was very high at 85.91% and, while the 
Jubilee Alliance won both the presidential contest and secured a parliamentary 
majority, elections for new devolved structures of government left many county 
governments in the hands of other parties. Though there have been numerous 
legal appeals over the outcome of many of the contests – including that for the 
president – the decisions of the courts have been generally timely and have been 
accepted, albeit often begrudgingly, by the losers. 
 
This apparent success deserves explanation given a history of election-related 
violence, high stakes involved, and fact that so much went wrong with the 
elections. There were multiple and extensive problems with voter identification 
– ironically, the result of a biometric registration system that had been 
introduced to improve public confidence in the system. Even more alarmingly, 
there was a complete breakdown of a new electronic system for the transmission 
and tallying of results that, again, had been introduced in an attempt to create a 
more credible system. The narrowness of the presidential result when it was 
finally declared, five days after the poll, made this uncertainty all the more 
significant – since, while Uhuru Kenyatta certainly secured a plurality of the vote, 
reported results gave him the absolute majority needed to avoid an expected 
run-off contest with the second most popular candidate, Raila Odinga, by just 
0.07%.   
 
Though Odinga formally accepted the verdict of the Supreme Court, which 
upheld the declared result, he has continued to claim that he was the victim of 
malpractice. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that a survey conducted in 
May 2013 found that only 56.1% of the population believed that the presidential 
election had been free and fair.2 Moreover, in Kenya’s poorest areas – the coast, 
the north, and the west – where the presidential vote went largely to Odinga, 
levels of popular confidence were even lower, an alarming signal that the 
elections had exacerbated a sense of marginalisation, rather than reduced it.3 
The much-delayed result of the complete set of election results, which came 
more than four months after the election, ended rumours that there had been 
wild disparities in the numbers of votes cast for different elections in some areas. 
However, a significant number of Kenyans remain convinced that the 
presidential election was stolen,4 while the sole exit poll, discussed by Long et al 
in this issue, provides further reason for suspicion.  
 
Any analysis of the elections must start by explaining the lack of violence; the 
emergence of, and patterns of support for new alliances; and the swiftness and 
effectiveness of a judicial system that until recently was seen as lacking 
credibility. Many of the papers in this special issue are directly concerned with 
these questions. This introduction draws from research conducted by the three 
authors as part of an election-monitoring project. However, while the analysis 
has been greatly enriched by their involvement in that collective endeavour, the 
arguments – and any mistakes – are the authors’ own.  
 
The paper argues that Kenya avoided disaster as a result of four interconnected 
processes. First, the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
prosecute Kenyatta and William Ruto for crimes against humanity for their 
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alleged role in the post-election violence of 2007/8 had the unexpected effect of 
bringing these former rivals together in the Jubilee Alliance, which reduced the 
prospect for violence between their respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities. Second, a pervasive “peace narrative” emerged, which 
delegitimised election protests and political activity seen to challenge the status 
quo and encourage instability. Combined with the heavy deployment of security 
forces in potential “hot spots”, this significantly constrained the options available 
to the losing candidate: civil disobedience was both less popular, and more risky, 
than in 2007/8. Third, the partial democratic reforms implemented in the run up 
to the election worked to undermine Odinga’s position – because many key 
democratic institutions had been reformed in line with Odinga’s own demands in 
the years leading up to 2013, he came under great pressure to accept the 
outcome of the process despite significant problems with it. Finally, the creation 
of a new constitution with 47 new county governments in which many Odinga 
supporters were able to secure county-level seats, meant that, while CORD lost 
nationally, they often won locally, softening the blow of the controversial 
presidential elections.  
 
The Kenyan case is therefore instructive for wider debates about 
democratisation and transitional justice, because it demonstrates the capacity 
for both international prosecutions and limited processes of institutional reform 
to empower a political establishment. The ICC proceedings against the leaders of 
the Jubilee Alliance enabled them to create a “siege mentality” among their 
communities that facilitated political mobilisation. At the same time, the partial 
institutional reform introduced following the 2007/8 crisis constrained Odinga’s 
ability to contest the election result, while a concentration on peace led to a 
politically constrained environment in which people felt unable to protest. As a 
result, the election left many CORD supporters questioning the value of the 
democratic reforms for which they had campaigned for so long. These are 
democracy’s discontents – those Kenyans who firmly believe that yet another 
election was stolen from them and their leaders, but who did not feel able to 
protest, and who have consequently lost faith in key institutions such as the 
executive, electoral commission and judiciary. 
 
By making these arguments we do not mean to imply that reformers should stop 
pushing for prosecutions or democracy, or campaigning for peaceful elections, 
but to highlight the unintended consequences such efforts can have. The solution 
is to improve the way in which we pursue peace, justice and reform, not to 
abandon these causes. Moreover, our conclusions are by no means wholly 
pessimistic. This was the first multi-party election that was not characterised by 
significant violence, which may be associated with lower expectations and, in 
turn, preparations for violence in the future. The self-interest of national 
politicians created space for accommodations between local communities that 
seemed impossible a few years ago. Televised debates forced many candidates – 
gubernatorial, as well as presidential – into a novel political forum that raised 
genuine policy questions. And the post-election implementation of party 
legislation may yet create a new sort of political party.  
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Staffan Lindberg has argued that the repeated holding of elections promotes 
democratisation – even if they are not fully free and fair.5 Although the way in 
which partial democratic reform actually undermined Odinga’s position in 2013 
challenges Lindberg’s optimism, it is still possible that Kenya will turn out to 
support his argument in the long-run – as the new constitutional dispensation, 
high voter turnout, peaceful transfer of power, and entry of many first-time 
elected office holders, may yet prove to have been a major step in the slow 
process towards democratic consolidation. 
 
The political landscape 
 
In the aftermath of the second liberation of the early 1990s, Kenya became a case 
study of the problematic relationship between multi-party elections and genuine 
political reform.6 President Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) maintained their hold on power. National elections in 1992 and 
1997 were each preceded by the explicit mobilisation of ethnic constituencies 
and substantial violence, which sought, at least in part, to drive Kikuyu, Luo, 
Luhya and Kisii voters – then associated with the opposition – out of particular 
areas. A two-term limit prevented Moi from standing again in 2002. 
Uncharacteristically he misjudged the politics of succession and backed 
Kenyatta, the son of his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, as the KANU presidential 
candidate thus unwittingly facilitating an alliance of major politicians and ethnic 
constituencies. Odinga, son of the veteran opposition politician Oginga Odinga, 
threw his weight behind the candidacy of a former regime insider, Mwai Kibaki, 
who swept to power in a largely peaceful election in which multiple minor 
irregularities were made irrelevant by the size of Kibaki’s overall victory. 
Kenyatta ensured a peaceful transition by conceding defeat without demur.7   
 
The moment of national optimism that resulted was brief. The appearance of 
political transition was partly illusory; KANU’s defeat had been rendered 
possible by the support of many established politicians and former government 
ministers for Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC). The new government 
had come to power with a commitment to create a new constitution, but debate 
over the terms of that constitution soon split NaRC. When Kibaki proposed a new 
constitution in 2005, Odinga campaigned against it on the grounds that it did not 
offer sufficient reform – it also failed to create the position of Prime Minister that 
Kibaki had promised him in return for electoral support. By building a coalition 
of influential regional leaders including Ruto, a key ally given his unrivalled 
ability to mobilize support in the populous Rift Valley, Odinga defeated the draft 
constitution in a referendum in which an orange became the symbol of his ‘no’ 
campaign.8 The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was born, and the split 
between Odinga and Kibaki became irrevocable. When national elections were 
held at the end of 2007, the two stood as rival candidates, with Odinga explicitly 
presenting himself as the candidate of change and reform.  
 
The multiple failings of the electoral process meant that the outcome of that 
election will never be known.9 The announcement of Kibaki as the winner 
triggered unprecedented violence. In Nyanza, Odinga’s home area, this largely 
took the form of public demonstrations; elsewhere, notably in the Rift Valley, but 
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also in Nairobi’s informal settlements, it took overtly ethnic lines, pitting 
Kalenjin, Luo and other ODM supporters against Kikuyu (widely seen as Kibaki’s 
core supporters) and Kisii (who had divided their vote between PNU and ODM). 
State security forces then responded to violence with a heavy hand, while 
members of the Kikuyu community later participated in “revenge attacks” in 
Nakuru and Naivasha towns in the Central Rift Valley. The Commission of 
Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, or Waki Commission, confirmed 1,133 
deaths in the unrest, and 300,000 more displaced10 – the government later 
increasing the latter figure to almost 700,000.11 In retrospect, it is worth noting 
that this violence may have claimed fewer lives than the prolonged election-
related violence of 1991 to 1993. Nevertheless, the intensity and geographical 
scope of the clashes, together with the unprecedented levels of displacement, 
came as a profound shock to Kenyans and to an international community that 
had assumed that 2002 had marked a stable political transition. A deal mediated 
by international negotiators appointed by the African Union ended the violence, 
and brought Odinga into a grand coalition government that was committed to 
introducing a new constitution.12 For most Kenyans, as well as the international 
community, the violence of early 2008 offered terrifying evidence both of the 
need for real political reform and value of peace and stability.13 
 
The polls of 2013 were intended to be a major step in the process of 
transforming Kenyan politics, as a new institutional structure for the conduct of 
elections, new judicial safeguards to ensure integrity, and a new regulatory 
framework for political parties were all linked to the new constitution, agreed by 
the coalition partners, and approved through a referendum in 2010. This 
constitution was meant to devolve power, end the ‘imperial presidency’, and 
ensure political stability and inclusion.14 The elections would seal the 
transformation, exemplifying the new politics even as they produced new 
democratic institutions that would oversee devolution. This was a bold scheme 
for engineering change through constitutional and institutional reform, inspired 
not simply by an urgent need to avoid any repeat of the events of 2007/8, but by 
a longer sense of frustration with a centralised political system that had 
entrenched inequality.15 Economic and political marginalisation was the key 
issue identified by critics of Kenya’s status quo – and credible elections and 
devolution were widely seen as the answer.16  
 
Political realignment and the victory of the “coalition of the accused” 
 
It was clear long before the elections that the new constitution had not changed 
Kenyan politics overnight.17 Politics still revolved around patronage and direct 
personal relationships between political leaders and those whose support they 
seek; if anything, the expenditure by political aspirants was even greater and 
more ostentatious. But the new coalitions formed were of great significance 
because, by bringing together Kenyatta and Ruto, the Jubilee Alliance reduced 
the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence at least in the short term. 
 
The campaign quickly exposed the continued weakness of political parties. 
Somewhat ironically, a salient feature of Kenyan multipartyism has been the 
ephemeral nature of political parties.18 Political change – and continuity – has 
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revolved around the manoeuvrings of prominent personalities who have claimed 
the role of ethnic and regional power-brokers, and who create parties often 
specifically for the purpose of elections. The new constitution of 2010 was meant 
to transform this politics, and to create in its place a political system that would 
be regulated and ordered by parties, which would encourage a new kind of 
policy-driven debate and undermine the politics of ethnic clientelism. But the 
uneven implementation of key pieces of legislation – and the selective 
application of some laws – meant that the parties of 2013 were as 
organisationally insubstantial and unaccountable as those of 2007. Each was 
associated with one national politician, and often with a particular ethnic group; 
none of them possessed the sort of enduring internal organisation that allows for 
popular policy debate; and most were, quite simply, very new.    
 
The party which had been declared the winner of the 2007 election, PNU, had 
vanished; so too had Kalonzo Musyoka’s ODM-K, which had formed an alliance of 
sorts with PNU after that election. In the place of ODM-K was the Wiper 
Democratic Movement (WDM). Apart from a scattering of minor parties that 
were at most of local significance (including, ironically, the once-dominant 
KANU), the only party that showed any sort of institutional continuity from 2007 
was ODM. But even this apparent continuity was largely illusory. Between 2008 
and 2012, the landscape of political alliances in Kenya had changed profoundly, 
and the ‘Pentagon’ of five regional power-brokers who had been at the centre of 
the 2007 ODM campaign had fragmented leaving only Odinga still associated 
with the party by 2013. 
 
The aftermath of the 2007/8 violence propelled that fragmentation. In this, as in 
so many respects, the 2013 elections can only be understood as the consequence 
of the multiple mistakes and problems of 2007/8. The Waki Commission found 
evidence that the election violence had been politically led. Ruto, then in the 
ODM Pentagon, was singled out for allegedly mobilising anti-Kikuyu attacks in 
the Rift Valley. At the same time, Kibaki-ally Kenyatta was alleged to have 
organized revenge attacks against Odinga’s Luo and Kalenjin supporters in 
Nakuru and Naivasha towns. The decision by the ICC to indict Kenyatta and Ruto 
for their role in the violence may have been intended as an attempt to be even-
handed, identifying one senior politician from either side of the political divide, 
but it had the entirely unintended result of driving the two men together. Once 
Kenyatta and Ruto came to realise that they shared a common interest in 
securing power and using it to protect themselves from international 
prosecution, they set about constructing the “coalition of the accused”, changing 
the dynamics of the election dramatically.19  
 
The ICC was not the only factor of course; after Odinga had secured the position 
of prime minister in the power sharing government inaugurated in 2008 his 
erstwhile Pentagon colleagues fell out with him, one after another, believing that 
he had failed to support them, or their communities. Well before the ICC cases 
started to dominate Kenyan politics, relations between Odinga and Ruto had 
deteriorated over accusations that Odinga had abandoned the Kalenjin who had 
“fought for him” in 2007/8. Odinga’s decision to order the eviction of mostly 
Kalenjin squatters from parts of the Mau escarpment in 2008 was a major rebuff 
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to Ruto and to the Kalenjin MPs allied to him. From that point on the relationship 
between the two men was doomed, and the ICC’s confirmation of charges in 
January 2012 against Kenyatta and Ruto completed their separation.  
 
The 2010 referendum over the new constitution offered an opportunity to Ruto, 
who threw his weight behind claims that it would favour Muslims and legalise 
abortion, in order to position himself as a spokesman for evangelical Christianity 
and to distance himself from Odinga. His campaign was unsuccessful, as the new 
constitution was approved with a large national majority, but the size of the ‘no’ 
vote in the Rift Valley confirmed Ruto as the principal Kalenjin politician, and no 
doubt gave him new credibility in discussions with Kenyatta.20 The ICC’s 
confirmation of charges in January 2012 then brought the two leaders yet closer 
together. In turn, while Kenyatta and Ruto’s alliance took time to settle – a 
reminder of the delicacy of the relationship between these politicians and their 
ethnic support bases – it facilitated a grassroots political accommodation which, 
temporarily at least, defused the chronic tension between Kikuyu and Kalenjin in 
the Rift Valley that had exploded so dramatically in previous elections.21  
 
There has been much debate over whether political violence in Kenya has 
primarily grown out of local-level grievances and jealousy, or whether such 
violence has routinely been incited by politicians who seek to encourage ethnic 
sentiment in order to instrumentalise it.22 Events in 2013 suggest that when 
national politicians are not encouraging ethnic violence it is less likely to occur; 
but also show the importance of  determined efforts at the local level to prevent 
any outbreaks of violence between these new allies, particularly in long-standing 
areas of tension such as Nakuru and Burnt Forest. As Lynch’s paper shows, 
Kenyatta and Ruto touted their alliance as an exemplar of peace for Kenyans 
more generally: as Kenyatta told one rally, “Our union with Ruto is informed by 
the need to preserve peace in the country”.23 There were limits to the alliance 
however, and Ruto took care to establish his own United Republican Party 
(URP), rather than joining Kenyatta’s The National Alliance party (TNA). They 
came together in December 2012 to form the Jubilee Alliance, a name that 
ingeniously combined multiple themes of Christian evangelism, redemption, and 
the celebration of Kenya’s independence. Without this political realignment, the 
election would have been radically different; with Ruto by his side, Odinga would 
likely have won a convincing victory, and the danger of ethnic violence along the 
lines of 2007 would have been far higher.  
 
Two of the lesser lights of the Pentagon, Najib Balala and Charity Ngilu also 
attached themselves to the new Jubilee Alliance. Neither commanded substantial 
support among the communities that they claimed to represent, but their 
presence allowed Jubilee to mock Odinga for having alienated all of his former 
allies. Another member of the former Pentagon, Musalia Mudavadi, dithered over 
his political choices, evidently hoping that – as many expected – he would be 
taken up by powerful figures around Kibaki as a presidential candidate who 
offered continuity and stability. The making, and immediate breaking, of a deal 
along those lines provided one of the most dramatic moments of the whole 
campaign, as Kenyatta first signed a deal with Mudavadi and then publicly 
renounced it claiming that he had only agreed to it under demonic influence; 
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Mudavadi ultimately stood as a candidate for another newly-created party, the 
United Democratic Forum (UDF).24 
 
These new parties all had money to spend, though in varying amounts – some 
provided from the individual or family wealth of the leaders, some drawn from 
donors seeking to purchase future political influence. But none had any 
organisational basis, and their fundamentally insubstantial nature was revealed 
by the embarrassing spectacle of party primaries. In general, these were poorly 
organised, undemocratic, and resulted in considerable anger against the 
perceived imposition of candidates close to the leadership against the will of 
party supporters. This proved to be a particular problem for the ODM in Nyanza 
and Siaya. These areas should have been its stronghold, but the expectation of 
various of Odinga’s relatives and friends that they should have the power to allot 
nominations led to confused and violent primaries.25 The impact of these locally 
acrimonious disputes on the elections may have been significant: turnout in 
Siaya and Nyanza was markedly lower than in the Jubilee strongholds, and it 
seems clear that Kenyatta’s presidential victory rested partly on such differences 
in turnout.  
 
The Jubilee Alliance also had other advantages. During the election campaign 
itself, new techniques supplemented old ones, rather than displacing them: there 
was, as Moss and O’Hare discuss in this issue, a televised presidential debate, but 
candidates also continued to address rallies where the crowd was swelled by 
direct gifts of t-shirts, food and cash. Campaigning was also more intense, as the 
lavish expenditure of money also helped the campaigns to acquire fleets of 
vehicles – and aircraft – and to occupy all forms of social space in a strikingly 
pervasive way.26 Alongside public meetings, billboards, radio commercials and 
television broadcasts, there was an increased internet and twitter presence 
where commentators and bloggers – some paid by candidates – offered 
campaign material thinly disguised as opinion.27  In this, as in much else, the 
campaign of “Uhuruto” – as the paired candidates were immediately dubbed – 
was most creative and effective.  
 
The Jubilee name also signalled another important element of the campaign, 
which tied Kenya’s fifty years of independence to an assertion of national 
sovereignty against western interference. Both elements of Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
name evoke independence in the Kenyan context, and Jubilee’s implicit 
celebration of independence was accompanied with an explicitly nationalist 
rhetoric which focused on the ICC, and cast Kenyatta and Ruto as victims of neo-
colonialism.28 This was not a novel rhetoric in Kenya – in the 1990s, Moi 
expended much energy on repeated denunciations of western interference – but 
it was pursued more determinedly and successfully by Jubilee, who tapped into a 
popular vein of resentment at perceived foreign interference.29 Kenyatta and 
Ruto presented themselves as leaders who had acted bravely to defend their 
communities and were consequently being persecuted by foreign powers, and 
who could – and should – be saved through the ballot box.30 Ruto especially 
played very successfully to the idea that he was an outsider, though he had been 
deeply involved in politics for more than two decades.31  
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By contrast, Odinga’s decision to make an alliance with his former adversary, the 
sitting vice-president Kalonzo Musyoka, and failure to resign as prime minister 
prior to the election, encouraged the sense that CORD was a coalition of 
incumbents – the “analogue generation” of former politicians, who had been 
outpaced by Jubilee’s “digital generation”. Odinga’s awkward performance in the 
television debate underlined his discomfort with this style of politics. The more 
accomplished style of the Jubilee presidential campaign no doubt owed 
something to the greater resources available to it, but Jubilee was smarter as 
well as richer. Odinga’s former Pentagon allies denounced him, and a one-time 
Odinga aide was encouraged to publish a memoir that depicted his erstwhile 
boss as an incompetent tyrant.32 Through such strategies, and a clever focus on 
the linked ideas of youth and technology, “Uhuruto” were able to present 
themselves as a team that offered change. This inverted the narrative of 2007 
when Odinga had made much of the Pentagon line-up and his outsider status.  
 
International response to the Jubilee campaign was maladroit, partly out of 
uncertainty. Until a few months before the election, neither European 
governments nor the US seem to have given much thought to how they would 
handle a Kenyatta victory, nor to how to coordinate their response. The formal 
mantra of “only essential contact” was inevitably open to differing 
interpretations. In trying not to say too much, more than one diplomat stumbled 
into policy statements that were vague, but could be interpreted as 
threatening.33 Jubilee readily seized these opportunities to present Kenyatta and 
Ruto as victims of an international conspiracy by “the west”. Consequently, while 
Brown and Raddatz’s paper in this collection argues that diplomats failed to use 
their influence to press for reform, it is clear that popular suspicion of “neo-
colonial” forces means that the consequences of such pressure can be 
unpredictable. Even after the election, for example, civil society groups seen to 
be too close to their western backers continue to be targeted by Jubilee leaders 
with serious consequences for their room for manoeuvre.  At the time of going to 
press, the government had just published The Miscellaneous Amendment Bill 
2013, which “seeks to cap the amount of foreign funds NGOs can get to 15 per 
cent of their budget”.34 The Bill is a powerful reminder, if one was needed, that 
international choices have far-reaching domestic consequences. 
 
This range of campaign strategies had an important impact on the electoral 
outcome, and the way that the public responded to it. Kenyatta, initially trailing 
in the opinion polls, gradually caught up with Odinga as the elections neared, and 
the last opinion polls found the result “too close to call”. Although it was clear 
that Kenyatta was closing the gap, many Odinga supporters found it hard to 
believe that his opponent could have cleared the “50% + 1” constitutional 
threshold required for a first round victory by the 8,000 votes (a 0.07% margin) 
announced by the electoral commission; their suspicions were further fuelled by 
the confusion created by the problems with the transmission and tallying of 
results. However, although ODM were quick to reject the results, it seems clear 
that the Jubilee Alliance was the more effective political machine. The parallel 
vote tabulation process generally lent credence to the  reported results (though 
it left open the issue of the first round majority, and the article by Long et al in 
this issue pursues the debate over that). Moreover, in contrast to 2007, when 
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Kibaki’s PNU performed less well in parliamentary and local elections than ODM, 
Jubilee emerged from the 2013 election with a majority in the other electoral 
contests: 58% of seats in the National Assembly and 57% in the Senate, as 
compared to CORD’s 39 and 43% respectively.35  
 
By using the ICC as a common enemy, Kenyatta and Ruto overcame the historical 
distrust between their two communities. As a result, victory and peace in the Rift 
Valley went hand in hand, but although the complex process of political 
realignment helps to explain both the election outcome and the containment of 
Kikuyu-Kalenjin tensions, we need to consider three further factors in order to 
understand why Odinga and his supporters ultimately decided against mass 
protest, despite Kenyatta’s slim first-round victory and the queries over various 
aspects of the electoral process.  
 
Peace as the marker of success? 
 
After the relative peace of the 2002 election, the events of 2007/8 were seen to 
bring Kenya “to the brink”36 and to threaten a “democratic rollback”.37 It was 
thus understandable that the spectre of election-related violence loomed large 
over the 2013 election,38 especially since the country now faced its most 
complicated election to date in a context where few (and no high level) 
perpetrators of previous election-related violence had been brought to justice;39 
levels of mistrust remained high in many parts of the country;40 many of the 
underlying issues (such as historical land injustices, inequality, and youth 
underemployment) had not been addressed;41 and security sector reforms 
lagged behind meaning that, the “very same policing structures blamed by many 
for serious human rights violations” during the post-election violence, remained 
in place.42 As a result, many Kenyans came to prioritize peace over political 
competition, creating a very different backdrop to the 2007 polls. 
 
The consequent rhetorical emphasis on peace was not novel. From independence 
and through to the early 1990s, the Kenyan public had routinely been enjoined 
to maintain peace and order during elections. For example, just before the 1974 
election, the Daily Nation told its readers that: “Peace and order are in the 
interest of every citizen, be he a policeman, a Government official or an ordinary 
citizen...The part which each person plays in this respect will be a major 
contribution to the nation’s image both here and abroad”.43 Such statements 
were associated with what Atieno Odhiambo has called the “ideology of order”, 
which was constantly rehearsed during elections, but which underpinned 
Kenyan politics throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, and through which the 
government insisted upon its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.44 
Elections between 1992 and 2007 saw rather less of this rhetoric, but it came 
back to the fore in 2013 and in a much more pervasive way due to the memories 
of 2007/8 and ongoing threat of further violence.  
 
Indeed, a wide array of actors encouraged Kenyans to be peaceful, and to actively 
participate in the cultivation of a broader culture of non-violence. Civil society, 
community and faith-based organisations across the country organised trainings, 
workshops, inter-community dialogues, and monitoring and conflict-resolution 
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activities; media houses and international organisations trained journalists on 
conflict-sensitive reporting and ran peace campaigns; and theatre groups, 
musicians, and public advertising all called upon Kenyans to vote in peace.45 
Most importantly, politicians competed to display their peace-loving credentials. 
In this way, and as discussed by Moss and O’Hare in this issue, presidential 
debates became a stage for the promotion of peace, while all of the major 
presidential candidates participated in a prayer rally a week before the election 
during which they vowed to maintain the same. This emphasis resonated with 
many ordinary Kenyans and with donors who funded a range of projects on 
early-warning, conflict resolution, and peace-building from civil society groups. 
 
The resulting “peace narrative” produced a general consensus among Kenya’s 
“political elite and the citizenry not to bring Kenya to the brink of civil war 
again”.46 For many Kenyans, peace was the most important issue during the 
election: revealingly, for those citizens who deem the election to have been free 
and fair, a lack of violence is one of the primary reasons cited.47 The peace 
narrative also served to shape and constrain political discourse and action, 
delegitimising dissent in a way that may have negative implications for Kenya’s 
longer-term peace and stability. Some commentators talked of the emergence of 
a “peace-ocracy”,48 and of how the “tyranny of peace messaging … led many to 
feel Kenya slaughtered justice at the altar of a temporary and deeply uneasy 
apparent calm”.49  
 
In other words, for all of the good work done as part of the peace narrative, it is 
also clear that “a peace-at-all-cost message … also suppressed frank discussion of 
critical reform issues that historically contributed to violent elections”.50 For 
example, a month before the election, the Inspector General of Police, David 
Kimaiyo, issued a directive that:  
 
Land should not be one of the issues on the campaign trail because it is so emotive 
and can trigger violence. All politicians should be self-respecting and should, 
forthwith stop dwelling on issues that will cause tensions and animosities.51  
 
As Willis and Chome’s paper suggests, this directive was mocked and 
disregarded on the coast, but elsewhere it may have helped Jubilee sidestep the 
tricky issue of the Kenyatta family’s large land holdings, and the narratives of 
historical land injustice that had hitherto divided their Kalenjin and Kikuyu 
support bases.52  
 
The peace narrative was also politically manipulated in other ways. Most 
notably, Jubilee emphasised the primacy of peace in order to discredit Odinga as 
a “trouble-maker” who had rejected the result and thus “caused” the post-
election violence in 2007/8, in contrast to Kenyatta who had accepted his defeat 
in 2002. This positioning helped mobilise support for Jubilee, but also made it 
extremely difficult for CORD to organise public demonstrations following the 
election for fear that this would further demonise Odinga among certain 
constituencies.  
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The opportunity to express dissent was also shaped by the peace narrative in 
more subtle ways. One prevalent message was that ordinary Kenyans were to 
blame for the intensity of violence in 2007/8. This fed into a range of civic 
education and other behaviour-shaping activities through which a particular 
notion of the “good citizen” was framed. According to this logic, a good citizen 
was “set up for [the] particular purpose”53 of peace-building, as an array of local, 
national and international efforts encouraged citizens to vote, return home and 
wait for – and then accept – election results. A good citizen would inform the 
authorities of any untoward behaviour, and take time to encourage dialogue and 
peaceful conflict resolution strategies at the family, neighbourhood and 
community level. Once again, such efforts had a clear impact on reducing the 
likelihood of violent conflict, but they also helped to curtail the range of activities 
that were deemed to be politically legitimate. 
 
Efforts to instil a particular framing of the “good citizen” were particularly 
effective when they came from powerful voices such as politicians, influential 
civil society organisations, and the media. Media houses together with local, 
national and international organisations offered targeted training for journalists 
on the idea and importance of conflict-sensitive reporting, the aim of which “was 
to sensitise journalists to be careful in what they report so [they] don’t arouse 
passions”.54 This included guidance on “setting agendas right, avoiding words 
that are alarming, and [ensuring that] different voices are given an opportunity 
to speak”.55  However, the constant reiteration of these messages also instilled a 
strong sense that individual journalists would “be the first person to be held 
responsible” for any report published.56 Together with the heavy criticism that 
journalists faced following the post-election violence of 2007/8 for their alleged 
role in fanning the violence – and the fact that journalists are also members of 
the communities from which they hail – this led to a level of self-censorship 
where the “message was massive turnout, patient crowds”,57 with little attention 
given to the shortcomings of the elections, which fostered a perception in certain 
quarters that the media had been “gagged or gagged itself … for [the] sake of 
peace”.58 
 
The pervasiveness of this peace discourse also helped to legitimise a range of 
more repressive measures including: the strategic location of security forces in 
CORD strongholds; an unconstitutional ban on political meetings and 
demonstrations in the wake of the elections on the basis that they constituted a 
“threat to peace”; and the use of force to quell dissent when it occurred, with six 
confirmed fatal police shootings during demonstrations following the Supreme 
Court’s validation of the presidential election on 30 March.59 Under these 
circumstances Odinga’s hands were firmly tied – to take his protests to the 
streets risked both delegitimisation and great harm to his supporters. As one 
commentator noted: “Kenyans have been praised for their “order” and 
“restraint” and control during this election, but how could it be otherwise” with 
over “90,000 military personnel…deployed across the country to guarantee 
“peace””.60  
 
The complex impact of the peace narrative has reinvigorated an old debate of 
peace versus justice – and of whether peace is an essential precondition for 
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governance, or whether “truth and justice are critical for real peace”.61 Thus, on 
the one hand, many interviewees in the Rift Valley were adamant that “peace 
was more important this time than anything else” and that now, instead of 
having to focus on recovering from another bout of election-related violence, the 
country has an “opportunity to reflect on promises”62 and “work on systems”.63 
On the other hand, CORD supporters speak of how “most communities [have] 
chosen the path of being quiet – not because [they’re] satisfied – but because 
[they] don’t know what to do next”.64 For them, peace was prioritised over a 
competitive and fair election leading to a “negative peace” characterised by the 
cessation of hostilities, rather than a “positive peace” built on trusting and 
harmonious inter-ethnic relations.65  
 
The new constitution and the limits of institutional design 
 
The new coalitions and the peace narrative were widely understood to constrain 
the options available to Odinga. The new constitution, on the other hand, was 
supposed to help him by creating a level playing field. Although strictly speaking 
there was no ‘incumbent’ and ‘opposition’ candidates, as both Kenyatta and 
Odinga had participated in the executive of the power sharing government, in 
practice, President Kibaki clearly preferred Kenyatta to Odinga, and it was 
widely believed that if state resources and personnel were used to manipulate 
the election, it would be to prevent Odinga from securing power. As a result, 
most Kenyans understood that the constitutional changes agreed in 2010 were 
of far greater benefit to Odinga than to Uhuru. The reality was more complex. 
While many important reforms were passed and the power of the president was 
reduced, these were not enough to deliver a credible election. Instead, the partial 
democratic reforms implemented in the run up to the polls served to confer a 
sense of legitimacy on the electoral system and so constrained the ability of 
Odinga to contest the result of a process that was extremely problematic.  
 
The process of institutional change between 2008 and 2013 was in many ways 
remarkable. The new constitution transferred some of the president’s powers of 
appointment to the legislature, created a second legislative chamber, introduced 
a new system of devolved government complete with 47 new counties – all with 
their own elected governors and assemblies – and established a Supreme Court. 
Partly as a result of the new constitution, and partly as a result of a related set of 
processes set in motion after the political violence of 2007/8, a number of other 
key institutions were also reformed. Most notably, the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya (ECK) was disbanded following criticism by the Independent Review 
Commission (IREC) – an international commission of inquiry set up by the 
Kenyan government to investigate the electoral process – and the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was formed in its place under the 
chairmanship of a hitherto untainted lawyer, Ahmed Issack Hassan.  
 
Police reform was also initiated following criticism of the performance of the 
police by the Waki Commission, which created a new unified body headed by an 
Inspector General of Police and civilian oversight body, although this process had 
barely gotten under way by the time of the elections.66 A process of judicial 
vetting by a panel of international judges proved to be more successful, and led 
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to the removal of three of the eight existing appellate judges in April 2012, and 
four more judges from the High Court, Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals by 
the end of the year.67 
 
These reforms had a dramatic impact on public confidence in key political 
institutions. Opinion polls conducted prior to polling day revealed that Kenyans 
had high levels of confidence in key institutions, most notably the judiciary.68 For 
its part, the IEBC enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings of 93% prior to the 
election.69 To a large extent, this unprecedented confidence in an electoral 
commission stemmed from the introduction of three new processes, which were 
meant to protect against rigging. First, voters were to be biometrically registered 
using their fingerprints to ensure that no individual could be on the register 
more than once. Second, voters were to be biometrically verified – in other 
words, in order to vote, individuals would have to prove who they were by 
providing the same fingerprint that was registered on file. Third, the election 
results were to be transmitted from the polling station level as soon as they were 
released using a specially designed mobile phone application, creating a 
provisional set of results that could then be used to detect any manipulation of 
the results when they were aggregated at the constituency and national level.  
 
Although the voter registration process failed to meet its target of 18 million, the 
IEBC registered more Kenyans than ever before and the electoral register was 
widely agreed to be a far better reflection of the actual electorate than that used 
in 2007 and 2010.70 But as the elections approached, the cracks in the system 
began to appear. Problems with procurement put intense pressure on the 
electoral timetable and ultimately led to criminal charges being brought against 
senior employees of the IEBC.71 There was insufficient time to trial the new 
processes; although the Commission had piloted biometric registration and 
mobile phone transmission during the constitutional referendum and by-
elections it had never operated these systems on such a vast scale.  
 
As soon as voting began, the electoral process fell apart. Some polling stations 
simply did not receive the necessary equipment to biometrically verify voters.72 
More typically, the equipment arrived, but the Electronic Voter Identification 
(EVID) kits did not work or ran out of power. According to the domestic 
Elections Observer Group (ELOG), the EVID kits failed in a majority (55.1%) of 
polling stations.73 When this happened, the polling station officials followed 
protocol and crossed voters’ names off on a paper list. There is nothing wrong 
with manual voting – which is the same process used in most democracies – but 
its failure was seen as a bad omen by CORD leaders; one of the key checks 
against rigging had failed. Worse was to come.  
 
When polling streams had finished counting their results, officials around the 
country found that they often could not submit the results through the mobile 
phone transmission system. The failure of the mobile phone transmission system 
did not directly affect the vote count – these results were only ever intended to 
be provisional and to act as a way of verifying the official process of tallying the 
paper forms – but the collapse of the process was nonetheless significant 
because it potentially left the system open to electoral manipulation, and thus 
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further dented the confidence of CORD leaders and supporters in the electoral 
process.74  
 
The impact of the mobile phone transmission system was exaggerated by CORD’s 
failure to provide party agents in an estimated 12.1 percent of polling streams.75 
Combined with the drawn out process of counting, which in some cases took 
days and forced even devoted party agents to withdraw to their beds, this 
undermined their capacity to scrutinize the vote count. The sense that there was 
no real way to check the process of tallying was exacerbated by a regrettable 
incident in which international election observers were expelled from the main 
tallying center in Nairobi; they were only readmitted to a position from where 
they could not effectively verify the process. Amid the uncertainty, rumours and 
accusations flew: many of the election forms were not signed by the relevant 
parties, over 100 percent turnout was recorded in some polling streams, and it 
became apparent that the IEBC was operating with multiple voters registers 
some of which included names that were not present when the registration 
process ended in December.76 All told, more components of the electoral system 
failed in 2013 than in 2007; subsequently, courts found significant procedural 
deficiencies in the elections of several governors and members of the national 
assembly and ordered fresh polls.77 
 
It was therefore unsurprising that, following the IEBC’s announcement that 
Kenyatta had won a surprise first round victory, CORD rejected the election 
results. But, in contrast to 2007, they did not take their protest to the streets. 
Instead, they followed the official procedures and – together with leading civil 
society activists through the Africa Centre for Governance (Africog) – appealed 
to the Supreme Court. In large part this was because of a lack of support for any 
other response due to the impact of the peace narrative discussed above. But 
Odinga’s decision was also shaped by the attitude of other actors towards the 
electoral process. In 2007, European Union election observers openly questioned 
the result of the election. Combined with popular frustration against the Kibaki 
regime and a general sense that the ECK had been compromised, this created an 
environment within which Odinga knew that he would have significant domestic 
and international support if he took his protest to the streets.78 The situation was 
very different in 2013. Keen to support Kenya’s new political institutions, many 
international electoral observers pulled their punches with influential donors 
keen to avoid a repeat of the instability and violence that shook the country in 
2007, while, as noted above, many Kenyans had come to see a peaceful election 
as a successful election.  
 
These changes, combined with CORD’s faith that the Supreme Court could be 
trusted to deliver a fair verdict, encouraged Odinga and other actors to play by 
the rules of the new political system. In his first public statement after the 
election result was announced, Odinga summarised his position as follows: ‘Let 
the Supreme Court determine whether the result announced by the IEBC 
[Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission] is a lawful one. We are 
confident the court will restore the faith of Kenyans in the democratic rule of 
law.’79 CORD leaders and prominent civil society activists were therefore 
dismayed when their petitions were not only rejected, but dismissed in a 
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perfunctory statement that, instead of recognising the many failures of the 
electoral process, simply stated that petitioners had failed to show that the final 
outcome was the wrong one.80  
 
CORD supporters made a number of telling critiques of the Court’s procedures 
and decisions: the two weeks they were allotted by the constitution was far too 
short to go through all of the relevant evidence; the presentation of a unanimous 
verdict appeared to be a political, rather than a judicial decision; some of the 
judges appeared not to have read all of the evidence presented to them; and, the 
burden of proof set by the Court was so high that, short of finding a smoking gun, 
it was hard to see what would have led them to re-run the election.81 While these 
complaints were not without foundation, they reflected a degree of naivety 
within the CORD hierarchy. The Court was always likely to take a conservative 
position: annulling the election based on procedural failures would set a 
dangerous precedent, as Kenyan elections are typically procedurally faulty, while 
there was also a vocal section of Kenyan society who were pleased with a Jubilee 
win and presented the largely peaceful election as a success and re-run as 
expensive and destabilising. Given this, it was always going to take strong 
evidence of systematic rigging to force the Court’s hand – and this is what CORD, 
operating under intense time pressure, could not provide. 
 
But having realised the limitations of the system, CORD leaders had little option 
but to accept it. Despite their limitations, the electoral commission and the 
judiciary continued to enjoy considerable domestic and international support.82 
In this way, the latest iteration of institutional reform in Kenya not only failed to 
protect the interests of the opposition, but also served to legitimise a 
problematic election. The Kenyan elections of 2013 thus have an important 
lesson to teach the democratisation literature: processes of iterative reform may 
generate more democratic political systems in the long-run, but in the short-run 
they can also empower incumbents.  
 
Devolution as an end to a zero-sum game 
 
The process of institutional reform also contributed to a peaceful election in 
other less problematic ways. Most notably, devolution – one of the more popular 
aspects of the new constitution – seems to have increased the willingness of 
opposition supporters to accept the results. According to the 2010 constitution, 
devolution is meant to bring government closer to the people, promote 
accountability, protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and 
marginalised groups, and facilitate an equitable sharing of national and local 
resources. Moreover, while the ability of decentralisation or devolution to 
achieve such ends – from the promotion of equitable development to more 
cohesive relations – has a mixed record in Kenya and beyond,83 at the time of the 
2013 elections, Kenyans were generally optimistic about what devolution could 
and would achieve.84  
 
In this context, it was significant that, while CORD supporters generally believed 
that the presidential elections were not free and fair, they had far more faith in 
sub-national polls.85 This was largely because the parties of the Jubilee Alliance 
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won very few seats in any of the areas with a significant CORD support base – the 
former Coast, Nyanza, Western, and Eastern provinces. Odinga’s ODM won 16 
governorships, eight more than Kenyatta’s TNA, and secured the same number of 
senators as its main rival (11). Moreover, ODM won 377 county assembly ward 
representatives – the best performance of any party. So, while Odinga supporters 
in these areas may have lost nationally, locally they are now typically governed 
by people of their own ethnic community and political persuasion thanks to the 
new constitution; and as Cornell and d’Arcy’s paper argues, the position of 
governor may yet create a new kind of politics. ODM even won the highly prized 
contest of Nairobi governor, giving the party a foothold in the country’s political 
and economic capital.86  
 
Given this wider context, even the most ardent Odinga supporter had to admit 
that not all of the elections could have been rigged. Devolution will remain an 
important mechanism for integrating CORD’s disgruntled support base into the 
political system so long as the new government is seen to respect the principle of 
decentralization with the latter leading to a fairer distribution of resources and 
economic development. 
 
Conclusion: “the triumph of democracy”? 
 
Kenya achieved a peaceful election, but at a cost. The focus on avoiding a return 
to conflict was understandable, but also constrained the possibility of political 
debate and contestation. This was a trade off that many Kenyans were prepared 
to make in 2013, but it is important to note that the same may not be true next 
time around. The fallout of the election has exaggerated a sense of political 
marginalisation within the communities that supported Odinga; peace may have 
been more important than victory, but for some the “theft” of the 2013 elections 
has been added to a long list of historical grievances.87 The fallout of the disputed 
polls has also undermined public confidence in the system – at least among 
CORD supporters.  The number of Kenyans reported to have a “lot of confidence” 
in the IEBC decreased from 62% before the election to 32% afterwards, while 
the number of Kenyans with “no confidence at all” in the Commission increased 
sharply from 2 to 22%.88  
 
Political stability may also be undermined from within the Jubilee Alliance. The 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities within the Rift Valley remain deeply 
suspicious of each other despite the success of Jubilee’s “anti-ICC” campaign; 
détente depends on the continuation of healthy relations between Kenyatta and 
Ruto. The history of coalitions in Kenya suggests that this marriage of 
convenience is likely to break down at some point. If it does, the likelihood of 
political violence around the next elections will increase dramatically. Kenya’s 
peace thus remains a fragile one.89  
 
This conclusion however, is not wholly pessimistic or defeatist. For all of the 
limitations of Kenya’s democratic system, the country may be undergoing a 
gradual process of democratization, and it is important to consider the complex 
and non-linear way in which democratic consolidation usually occurs. Andreas 
Schedler has argued that in processes of democratisation two games are being 
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played simultaneously: “At the same time as incumbents and opponents measure 
their forces in the electoral arena, they battle over the basic rules that shape the 
electoral arena”. These two battles are intimately linked.90  
 
Desperate to hold onto power, governments seek to give themselves an unfair 
advantage in electoral contests. But in order to retain credibility and 
international finance, they are often forced to make small concessions before or 
in the wake of elections and these changes, over time, create fresh opportunities 
for opposition parties. In turn, stronger electoral performances enable the 
opposition to bring greater pressure to bear for far reaching constitutional 
reform, which in turn creates the conditions under which the opposition can 
make further gains. In cases where governments are unable to effectively contain 
popular frustrations this virtuous cycle can result in a more level playing field 
and, ultimately, opposition victories. 
 
Staffan Lindberg’s work on Africa complements Schedler’s more general 
framework, pointing to the way in which elections train voters and opposition 
parties in democratic arts and thus inculcate democratic norms and values, and 
lead to more effective reform coalitions, over time.91 Lindberg describes a 
process of “democratization by elections” similar to the virtuous cycle identified 
by Schedler, in which the more elections a country holds, the higher the quality 
of civil liberties. In particular, Lindberg finds that democratic gains are 
particularly likely to be reaped once countries have held three consecutive 
elections. 
  
These two stylized accounts help to illuminate the battle for democracy in Kenya 
over the last two decades. Democratic reforms in Kenya have never been given; 
they have always had to be fought for, in line with the basic assumption that 
underpins Schedler’s approach. More specifically, the interconnected processes 
of electoral reform and electoral competition have played out in much the way 
that Schedler and Lindberg describe. Although incumbents have constantly 
sought to block reform, Kenya has made remarkable progress over the last 
twenty years. President Moi may have implemented the most minimal reforms 
possible in order to sustain the flow of international financial assistance and win 
poor quality elections,92 but over time his decision to lift the ban on opposition 
parties and allow them to campaign with fewer restrictions on their activities, 
changed the nature of electoral competition. Over five successive elections 
(Kenya passed Lindberg’s three election threshold in 2002), Kenyan voters and 
opposition parties converted political openings into political change – the 
National Assembly, for example, now enjoys relatively high levels of 
independence from the executive, as Opalo argues in this issue.93  
Of course, this process has not been without its setbacks. The breakdown of the 
political system around the 2007 elections provided damning evidence of the 
lack of consensus on the need to play by the rules of the democratic game.94 But 
the violence did not bring an end to the slow process of institutional change; 
rather, it created a new window of opportunity within which long deferred 
reforms were initiated. Because of this process and Kibaki’s willingness to 
support constitutional change in 2010, Kenya now has a constitution that 
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features stronger checks and balances and is potentially far more effective at 
integrating marginalised communities into the political system. Thus, despite the 
failings of the electoral system in 2013, the cumulative effect of these changes 
should not be underestimated.  
 
From a constrained media in 1992, the Kenyan press has become one of the most 
vibrant on the continent – although the passage of recent legislation that could 
pave the way for the creation of a Communications and Multimedia Appeals 
Tribunal with the capacity to impose penalties of up to £146,710 on journalists 
that violate a code of conduct is a major cause for concern.95 Opposition parties 
are largely free to organise their own campaigns and hold rallies, and while 
presidential elections have – with the exception of 2002 – been won by the 
candidate with the greatest access to state funding and support, opposition 
parties have regularly won around half the seats in parliament. Progress towards 
democratic consolidation is therefore being made, if unevenly and with ongoing 
threats.   
 
Over the past twenty years, Kenya has therefore undergone two very different 
processes simultaneously. In one, a perception of an ethnically biased state and 
the political manipulation of ethnic identities around election times have 
increased inter-communal tensions and the prospects for civil conflict. In 
another, a gradual process of iterative reform has moved the country from one of 
the continent’s more repressive regimes to a relatively open and competitive 
political environment. So far, these two trajectories have occurred side-by-side 
and it is not yet clear which will win out. While institutional change has so far 
proved insufficient to resolve inter-communal tensions, ethnic politics has yet to 
completely undermine the process of gradual reform – as the passage of the new 
constitution after the post-election violence of 2008 demonstrates. Building a 
stable democracy will not be easy, but it is far from impossible. 
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